The principle of distinction and discrimination of combatants and non-combatants is the cornerstone of international humanitarian law (Quenivet 2008: 342).
Here, provisions to provide protection for these civilians under international human rights law are suggested to alleviate the situation. Finally, the essay suggests that those civilians, who perhaps need it the most – those in the areas under control of belligerent non-state actors –, are left without effective legal protection of arbitrary use of force. The divergent perspectives of humanitarian and human rights law are presented, the issues of applicability discussed and contemporary jurisprudence debated. Then the essay presents a specific example of the use of force against civilians in non-international armed conflicts. The essay starts with discussion of basic tenets and instruments of the international humanitarian law, followed by a contrasting discussion with features of international human rights law. There exist lacunae in application of both and further improvement in application of existing regimes is necessary to ensure protection of civilians. As the essay suggests, this interplay is not necessarily smooth or easy. However, the realities of armed conflicts require their interdependency for the sake of their common aim – protection of innocent victims of armed conflicts. This essay aligns its argument with the strand in international legal thought that argues that humanitarian and human rights law build on two very distinct perspectives of protection of civilians during armed conflicts and therefore, present two independent legal regimes, which were not necessarily designed to closely coexist (Droege 2008: 548).
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